「釋義」

新型風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生于以前沒有想過或沒有看到的情況。新型風(fēng)險使常規(guī)的風(fēng)險管理變得無效，更嚴(yán)重的是，使管理層誤以為風(fēng)險已經(jīng)減輕，而事實上，新型風(fēng)險可能會升級為嚴(yán)重甚至致命的后果。

「應(yīng)用場景」

新型風(fēng)險逐漸顯現(xiàn)的一個最明顯的標(biāo)志就是出現(xiàn)異?，F(xiàn)象，即無法理解的事物。這點說起來似乎是理所當(dāng)然的，但許多異?，F(xiàn)象其實很難察覺和應(yīng)對。

The clearest signal that a novel risk is emerging is anomalies—things that just don’t make sense. This sounds obvious, but most anomalies are difficult for people to recognize or process.

比如上文提過的兩個例子。有經(jīng)驗的半導(dǎo)體元件采購負(fù)責(zé)人原本應(yīng)當(dāng)充分認(rèn)識到，哪怕是小型火災(zāi)也會產(chǎn)生煙塵，撲救過程也要用到很多水，很可能影響無塵車間。波音公司的高層風(fēng)險管理負(fù)責(zé)人理應(yīng)熟悉復(fù)雜的工程項目，應(yīng)當(dāng)能夠預(yù)見到，讓一級供應(yīng)商接手從未做過的重大任務(wù)、采用此前從未在大型飛機(jī)上使用過的新型材料、以全新的電子控制系統(tǒng)取代原本的模擬液壓控制系統(tǒng)，很可能會造成新型風(fēng)險。

Take two of the cases already described. An experienced purchasing manager for semiconductors should arguably have realized that the soot, smoke, and large quantities of water that accompany even a minor fire could compromise the integrity of clean rooms. A senior risk manager at Boeing, presumably familiar with complex engineering projects, should have anticipated that novel risks could arise in the development of a plane when first-tier suppliers were performing major tasks they had never done before, the plane incorporated materials never used before at such a scale in a large aircraft, and familiar analog hydraulic controls were replaced with entirely new electronic ones.

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以上文字選自《哈佛商業(yè)評論》中文版2020年11月刊《無法預(yù)測的風(fēng)險》

羅伯特·卡普蘭（Robert S. Kaplan）?赫爾曼·倫納德（Herman B. Leonard）?安內(nèi)特·米凱什（Anette Mikes） | 文

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